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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
DONALD THEODORE SUNDQUIST, 
vs. 
Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, 
MARY ALICE SUNDQUIST, 
Defendant/ 
Respondent. 
---0000000---
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 17057 
This is a review of the District Court's ruling on 
defendant's order to show cause that no trust had been created by 
the parties or in the alternative that in the event on appeal a 
trust was found to have been created, said trust is terminated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 16, 1973, the parties to a divorce proceeding 
entered into a property settlement agreement and stipulation 
where in ,r10 they agreed that income derived from the interest 
held by the parties in a real estate syndicate should be estab-
lished as a family trust known as the Sunquist Family Trust Fund 
with the plaintiff and defendant as trustees and with the 
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restriction and requirement that said funds be accumulated for 
the education of the minor children of the parties at such time 
as the children had received or terminated their advanced educa-
tion, any sums remaining in said trust fund should be equally 
divided between the plaintiff and defendant (Record, p. 40, 41). 
The parties' agreement was incorporated into ,f ( j) of the Decree 
of Divorce signed by the court on October 24, 1973 (Record, p. 
49, 50). A savings account was set up with the defendant's con-
sent, the purpose of the account was to provide funds to educate 
the children (Record, p. 108-7, 108-24). 
The parties returned to court on April 27, 1976 on 
plaintiff's order to show cause and entered into a written stipu-
lation wherein the defendant agreed to remove herself as a joint 
signatory from the account and that the plaintiff would be the 
sole signator for the account from which funds were withdrawn for 
the educational pursuits of the children (Record, p. 56, 57). 
The stipulation of the parties was ratified by an order by the 
court acknowledging the existence of the fund and the use of the 
fund for the education of the parties' minor children (Record, p. 
60-62). The court then entered an amended order which stated 
"the trust fund shall continue to contribute to the educational 
costs of the children so long as proper evidence of costs related 
to the higher education of the children are provided" {Record, p. 
66). 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The defendant filed an order to show cause as to why the 
trust fund created for the education of the minor children of the 
parties should not be terminated and the proceeds distributed 
equally between plaintiff and defendant {Record, p. 73). The 
defendant, in her affidavit filed in support of the order to show 
cause, states, "the purpose of the trust, to educate the minor 
children of the parties, has now been accomplished and the assets 
of the trust should be distributed to plaintiff ·and defendant 
equally" {Record, p. 68). The order to show cause came on for 
hearing on October 16, ~979 and at that time counsel for defen-
dant in argument stated that the trust should be eliminated 
because of friction (Record, p. 71) • At the trial heard on 
February 8, 1980, the defendant, throughout her testimony, con-
tinually acknowledged the existence of a trust and the only 
remedy sought by her was that the trust be terminated. The main 
reason for its termination she stated was because of the friction 
between the parties (Record, p. 108-15, 108-18). The defendant 
presented no evidence to show that the parties' three children 
did not intend to go on with their education {Record, p. 108-
18). The defendant further admitted in her testimony that she 
entered into an addendum to the trust agreement on January 25, 
1975 which. addendum stated that the completion of the trust would 
be when all the beneficiaries have completed their higher educa-
tion (Plaintiff's Exhibit "C"). Plaintiff's testimony at the 
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trial was that the trust was set up for an indefinite period 
until the parties' children had received their education and that 
at the time of the hearing, the children were taking courses in 
higher education (Record, p. 108-28, 108-29, 108-30, 108-34). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks an order of the court directing a 
reversal of the trial court's order and reins ti tu ting the trust 
fund with the funds previously divided between the parties and 
the awarding of attorney's fees for plaintiff's defense of the 
trust or in the alternative, an order remanding the matter to the 
trial court so that the issue of whether or not the trust exists 
can be properly heard with notice to the parties. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A TRUST HAD BEEN CREATED BY THE PARTIES 
PURSUANT TO AN ORDER OF THE COURT 
In order to create a trust, certain requirements exist. 
Those requirements include a competent settler and a trustee, an 
ascertainable trust res, and sufficiently certain beneficiaries, 
76 Arn. Jur.2d Trusts §31. All of the above requirements have 
been met in the instant case. The settlers, being the parties in 
this case have clearly manifested their intent in no fewer than 
eight (8) written documents and have themselves indicated that a 
trust exists for the education of their children. Both plaintiff 
-4-
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and defendant, in their complaint and answer and counterclaim 
respectively indicated that they wished a trust fund to be estab-
lished for the education of the children (Record, p. 2, 6). These 
intentions were formalized in a property settlement agreement 
which was subsequently incorporated into the Decree of Divorce 
(Record, p. 40, 41, and 49). Subsequent to the Decree of Divorce, 
the parties in fact created a savings account with the proceeds 
of the fund, the purpose of the savings account was to provide 
proceeds to educate the children (Record, p. 108-24). 
The parties themselves acted as trustees and in fact the 
plaintiff went to court to remove the defendant as a trustee 
(Record I p. 54) e As a result, the parties entered into a stipu-
lation which acknowledged that the plaintiff was· to be the sole 
signator on the savings account from which the trust funds would 
be withdrawn (Record, p. 56, 57). An order (Record, p. 60, 61, 
62) and an amended order (Record, p. 64, 65, 66) embodying the 
language of the stipulation and ratifying the same was entered by 
the court acknowledging the savings account in fact held the 
trust fund and further acknowledging that the fund was to be used 
for the education of the parties' children. 
Thus, there can be no doubt that the beneficiaries of 
the trust as named were the parties' children, and that a savings 
account held the funds which would be used to educate the chil-
dren. Therefore, the requirements of a trust were fulfilled, 
-5-
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acted and relied upon by the parties and the court itself. 
Loco Credit Union vs. Reed, 516 P.2d 1112, (New Mexico, 
1973) relates a fact situation quite similar to the case at 
issue. The parties in obtaining a divorce had entered into a 
written property settlement agreement wherein the parties agreed 
that a sum of money on deposit with a credit union (Loco) be held 
in trust by the plaintiff for the expenses of the college educa-
tion of the children of the parties and as much of the sum that 
would not be used for the college education of the son should be 
used . for the expense of the college education of the daughter. 
The stipulation was incorporated into the Decree of Divorce and 
subsequent to that time, the credit union attacked the fact that 
a trust had been created and was in existence. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court, following basic trust law found that a trust in 
fact existed and set forth the following ruling: 
There was no provision in the written instrument evi-
dencing the creation of the trust reserving unto the 
settlers the power to revoke the trust. Therefore, the 
trust was irrevocable. 4 Scott on Trusts, §330 .1 (3rd 
Ed., 1967) and cases cited therein holding in accord. 
The rights ano duties of the trustee not detailed in the 
trust instrument are sufficiently detailed in the law of 
trusts. No claim has been made by either of the set-
tlers, who are the only ones who have served as trust-
ees, or by the beneficiaries, or anyone on their behalf, 
that there has been any question as to the rights and 
duties of the trustee, except as to the extent above 
indicated. The use to be made of the trust property is 
clearly stated in the written instrument evidencing the 
creation of the trust. Minute details, as to the pre-
cise items for which funds in an educational trust must 
be used, are not necessary for the trust's validity. In 
-6-
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fact,. a detailed limitation upon the expenditures to be 
made for precisely anticipated i terns would be far more 
likely to defeat· the beneficial purposes of an educa-
tional trust than would the general provision that the 
trust funds are to be used for the college education of 
the beneficiary. 
Since the written instrument evidencing the trust's 
creation fails to show an agreement as to the date of 
the termination of the trust, it will continue until the 
trust purposes have been accomplished. The time of the 
ending of the trust need not appear in the writing. 
Bogert, Trust & Trustees, Supra, §87 at 489. 
The trial court, therefore, had no basis either in law 
or in fact to support a finding that a trust did not exist. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
TERMS OF THE TRUST WERE AMBIGUOUS AND THAT THE 
PURPOSES OF THE TRUST HAVE BEEN FULFILLED. 
The testimony presented at the hearing in the matter by 
the defendant clearly indicated that the purpose of the trust had 
not been fulfilled. In response to a direct question by plain-
tiff's counsel, "do you have any statements or ~vidence to show 
the court that any of the three children do not intend to go on 
with their education?" The defendant responded, "no, I don't." 
In response to counsel's furthe-r questioning, "and, in fact, Joel 
and Alyce have indicated to you, th~t they have not, that they 
wish to further their education? Answer: Yes." (Record, p. 
108-18) • 
The statements submitted at trial by the children 
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show that in fact both Alyce and Joel intend to continue on with 
their education. The statements submitted indicate that the 
children remain impartial regarding a decision regarding the 
trust and only Matt Sunguist affirmatively agreed that the trust 
should be terminated (Defendant's Exhibit 1). In Clayton v. 
Behle, 565 P.2d 1132 (Utah, 1977} this court stated "a trust may 
be terminated where its continuance is not necessary to carry out 
a material purpose of the trust where all the beneficiaries 
thereof consent, and where none of them are under any incapacity; 
and where the settler is the sole beneficiary, by the weight of 
authority he can terminate the trust at any time and compel the 
trustee to reconvey the property to him. Th is is true even 
though the purposes of the trust have not been fully accom-
plished." (Emphasis added. } In the present case, not all the 
beneficiaries have consented to the termination of the trust nor 
did the set tlors reserve any right to terminate the trust. As 
previously stated in the Loco case, Supra and stated in Clayton: 
"The rule of law as stated in Scott's Abridgment of the Law of 
Trusts, 1960 Ed. at page 607 as follows: 
Where a trust is created inter vivas, the question often 
arises whether the settler can revoke the trust. Whereby 
the terms of the trust he has reserved a power of revo-
cation, he can revoke the trust in the manner in which 
and to the extent to which he has reserved such a power. 
On the other hand, if he has not reserved a power of 
revocation, he cannot revoke the trust. 
The evidence clearly indicates that the purpose of the trust has 
-8-
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not been accomplished, and the beneficiaries have not all con-
sented to the termination of the trust. Therefore the purposes 
of the trust have not been fulfilled. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF WAS PREJUDICED BY THE COURT'S RULING 
SUA SPONTE THAT A TRUST DID NOT EXIST SINCE 
SUCH ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED OR TRIED TO THE COURT. 
The ruling by the trial court sua sponte that a trust 
did not exist was prejudicial to the plaintiff in that plaintiff 
had no opportunity t~ rebutte by evidence or testimony any of the 
contentions the trial court had regarding the validity or ex is-
tence of the trust. Defendant's order to show cause simply 
states in part: 
Then and there to show cause if any you have why the 
decree is amended herein, which required that a trust 
fund be created for the education of the minor children 
of the parties, should not be terminated and the pro-
ceeds distributed equally between plaintiff and defen-
dant. (Record, p. 73) 
At the time of the original order to show cause hearing, 
the thrust of counsel for defendant's argument is set forth in 
~e minute entry "counsel for defendant responds stating that the 
trust should be eliminated because of friction." (Record, p. 
71.) During the hearing on the matter, counsel for defendant 
never raised the issue as to whether or not the trust was in 
existence and in fact throughout the record keeps referring to 
the trust and in closing argument to the court indicated that the 
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relief sought by the defendant was termination of the trust, not 
the existence of the trust (Record, p. 108-43, 108-44, 108-45). 
This court has stated in National Farmers Union Property 
& Casualty Company v. Thompson, 4 Ut.2d 7, 13, 286 P.2d, 249, 
253, "notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate technicali-
ties and liberalized procedure, we must not lose sight of the 
cardinal principal that under our system of justice, if an issue 
is to be tried and a parties' rights concluded with respect 
thereto, he must have notice thereof and an opportunity to meet 
it." 
The defendant, by not raising the issue of the existence 
of the trust in her pleadings nor at the hearing and the court 
having ruled sua sponte, severely prejudiced the plaintiff in 
that the plaintiff could have been prepared to meet those issues 
and present the necessary evidence though testimony and documents 
and argument to respond to the issue. By ruling after the case 
was presented and by the court's raising a new issue, i.e., the 
existence of the trust itself, the plaintiff was prejudiced. 
IV. 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF'S 
ATTORNEY'S FEES SINCE PLAINTIFF WAS ACTING 
TO DEFEND THE EXISTENCE OF THE TRUST IN 
RESISTING DEFENDANT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. 
The plaintiff was at all times seeking to preserve and 
protect the trust from termination. The resultant legal fees 
-10-
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which plaintiff inc·urred were not for his own benefit, but were 
in defense of the trust. 76 Am. Jur.2d Trusts, §532 states: 
A trustee is entitled to reimbursement or exoneration in 
a reasonable amount for fees of counsel properly em-
ployed in th~ administration of the estate, for the 
costs of litigation and suits against the trust estate 
which it is his duty to defend, and for the costs of 
suits properly brought in behalf of the estate. (Empha-
sis added.} 
Therefore, if the trust is reinstated, plaintiff should 
be reimbursed for his legal fees and costs of court incurred 
herein. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence and testimony presented at the time of 
hearing clearly indicates that the trial court erred in its find-
ings that a trust was not created and that the terms of ·the trust 
~re ambiguous and that the purposes of the trust have been ful-
filled. The evidence at· the hearing clearly indicates that two 
of the parties' children were planning to continue on with their 
higher education, that an account was set up with the proceeds of 
the real property and was being utilized for the sole purpose of 
meeting the children's educational financial needs. 
THEREFORE, the trial court's order should be reversed 
and the trust be reinstated with plaintiff to be reimbursed for 
his attorney 1 s fees incurred in defense of the trust. In the 
alternative, should the court find that the evidence contained in 
the record is not sufficient to establish the existence of a 
, , -
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trust, then the matter should be remanded to the trial court for 
a hearing to determine whether or not a trust is in existence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
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